CEMAC: a trade surplus of USD 10.2 billion with China that masks internal fractures
For a decade, China has established itself as the leading trading partner of the CEMAC zone (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad), driven by its oil purchases and its sales of manufactured goods. The first half of 2026 confirms this dynamic on a large scale. According to Chinese customs, cited by Financial Afrik, the volume of trade between Beijing and the six CEMAC states reached 5,925.9 billion CFA francs, or around 10.2 billion USD. This trade generates a net surplus close to 2 billion USD in favour of the regional bloc, generated mainly by oil exports from Congo, Gabon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea. This aggregate surplus benefits above all the oil-producing states, while Cameroon and the Central African Republic, lacking comparable oil rents, import massively Chinese equipment and manufactured goods, without the source detailing their own bilateral balance. This result illustrates the structurally unequal nature of the partnership: the overall performance masks a persistent dependence on hydrocarbons for some, a potential deficit for others, and a common exposure to the volatility of world oil prices, with no local processing or industrial diversification visible at this stage.

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An uneven trade dynamic
The CEMAC zone, which brings together Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad, has seen its trade with China reach new heights, with the volume of trade between Beijing and the six CEMAC states reaching 5,925.9 billion CFA francs, or around 10.2 billion USD. This figure, although impressive, raises questions about the very nature of this partnership. Indeed, a net surplus close to 2 billion USD thanks to oil exports from Congo, Gabon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea masks a more complex reality. Oil-producing countries, such as Congo and Gabon, benefit from a significant rent, while Cameroon and the Central African Republic, lacking comparable oil rents, import massively Chinese equipment and manufactured goods. This situation highlights the internal fractures within CEMAC, where the benefits of flourishing trade are not distributed equitably among member states.
Dependence on hydrocarbons
The structurally unequal nature of the partnership: overall performance masks a persistent dependence on hydrocarbons. This economic model, based on the export of raw materials, exposes the region to considerable risks in the event of an oil shock. In the absence of a diversified industrial base, the capacity of CEMAC countries to withstand market variations remains limited. For Cameroon, which shows a trade deficit with China, this dependence on hydrocarbons is particularly worrying. This underlines the urgency of economic diversification to avoid a scenario in which the country would be even more vulnerable to fluctuations in world markets.
Preferential access to Chinese markets
On 1 May 2026, China introduced a total customs exemption for exports from 53 African countries, a measure that could have significant implications for CEMAC. However, the potential benefit of the measure will depend largely on the capacity of non-oil economies, starting with Cameroon, to diversify their export offering beyond raw materials. This means that it is essential to develop industrial sectors capable of producing high value-added goods, instead of remaining in a raw material export model. Analysts stress that this Chinese initiative could also be perceived as a geopolitical strategy aimed at securing access to critical resources, while diverting Chinese industrial overcapacities to Africa. Thus, the central question for CEMAC capitals is therefore not so much the gross volume of trade as their capacity to transform preferential access to the Chinese market into real productive diversification.
A trade picture to be put into perspective
It is important to put trade between CEMAC and China into perspective relative to overall trade between China and Africa. Trade with CEMAC represents only around 5% of Sino-African trade, which puts into perspective the discourse that presents the region as a strategic pole for Beijing. Indeed, that is a 24% year-on-year increase, according to Chinese customs; CEMAC's share in China's foreign trade remains marginal. This situation raises questions about CEMAC's capacity to assert itself as a significant economic actor on the international stage. Hydrocarbon dependence for some, a potential deficit for others, and a common exposure to the volatility of world oil prices, with no local processing or industrial diversification visible at this stage.
Source: Financial Afrik
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Translated from the French original : [CEMAC : un excédent commercial de 10,2 milliards USD avec la Chine qui cache des fractures internes](/article/649ad5ae-652f-4f4f-879c-7f3cca99ac80)
Source : Financial Afrik
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